On the Net: Baran, Dreyfus, Merleau-Ponty, and Austin by Kaneko, Yusuke
武蔵野大学学術機関リポジトリ　Musashino University Academic Institutional Repositry
On the Net Baran, Dreyfus, Merleau-Ponty, and
Austin
著者 金子 裕介
著者（英） Kaneko Yusuke
journal or
publication title
The Basis : The annual bulletin of Research
Center for Liberal Education, Musashino
University
number 10
page range 183-201
year 2020-03-01
URL http://id.nii.ac.jp/1419/00001197/
183
武蔵野大学教養教育リサーチセンター 紀要 e Basis Vol.10（2020.3）
On the Net
Baran, Dreyfus, Merleau-Ponty, and Austin1
Yusuke Kaneko
§1.  Introduction
e Internet was born in 1960’s, then Internet ethics appeared as a branch of information ethics.
Information ethics is that branch of applied ethics2 which studies and analyzes social 
and ethical impacts of ICT (Information and Communication Technology)3. 
It seems, however, our status on the Net4 is not yet scrutinized. True, Norbert Wiener 
(1894-1964), the father of information ethics, considered humans the bearers of information5. 
But information is mathematical stu6. Wiener’s view seemingly robs humans of that 
spontaneity of thinking7 which is necessary for ethics. 
We are all humans even on the Net, not a pattern of information processing. In other 
words, we are still in a position to do something ethical, ethically good or ethically bad. 
is is our focus below.
Most exchanges on the Net are tries as we see on SNS’s8, such as blogs, BBS’s9, Twitter, 
Facebook, and Instagram. And Dreyfus, another pioneer of Internet ethics, simply warned 
us about inhumanity－in the sense that the transaction on the Net is merely virtual－of the 
Internet (see ch.2 below).  
Nevertheless, focusing on its opposite side is necessary. True, we are virtual on the Net, or 
more precisely, anonymous and purely verbal entities. But the interchange we are involved 
in has potential risks we never think of. We survey this pitfall on the Net by reference to 
the so-called speech-act theory (ch.3-ch.4).   
Chapter 1.  Overall Picture
Our object of study is the Internet. But what is the Internet? You may not answer this 
question well. To begin with, therefore, we need a clear image of the Internet.
is investigation will lead us to an ideology underlying the Net. We reach it through 
a short history of the Internet.
§2.  Picture of the Internet10
Asked what it is like to be on the Net, you may not answer so well, but can appeal to the 
following concise picture:
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(1) Client-Server System11
is is the simplest way to overview the World Wide Web12. Each of us is situated as “Client,” 
connected to a host computer, which is depicted larger, called “Server.” ese host computers 
constitute the World Wide Web substantially.     
§3.  No Center
With the simplest picture provided, one thing looms up. e World Wide Web has no center.
Servers are providers. ey only provide the Internet services, the connection to the 
Net; they do not regulate the conduct of their users.
In a word, the realm of the Internet is anarchic. Actually, this was perceived as early as 
in the nineties:
(2) Why do people want to be “on the Internet?” One of the main reasons is simple 
freedom. e Internet is a rare example of a true, modern, functional anarchy. 
ere is no “Internet Inc.” ere are no ocial censors, no bosses, no board of directors, 
no stockholders. In principle, any node can speak as a peer to any other node, as 
long as it obeys the rules of the TCP/IP protocols, which are strictly technical, not 
social or political. (Sterling 1993)
(3) To withstand a nuclear blast and keep on ticking, the Net was built without a central 
command authority. at means that nobody owns it, nobody runs it, nobody has 
the power to kick anybody o for good. ere isn’t even a master switch that can 
shut it down in case of emergency. “It’s the closest thing to true anarchy that ever 
existed,” says Cliord Stoll, a Berkeley astronomer famous on the Internet for having 
trapped a German spy who was trying to use it to break into U.S. military computers. 
(Elmer-DeWitt 2001)
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§4.  History of the Internet
Bruce Sterling (1954- ), who wrote (2), is a famous science ction writer. Philip Elmer-DeWitt 
(1949- ), who wrote (3), is a contributor to TIME. is secular taste (an SF writer and 
TIME contributor) has been detested by not a few specialists, or computer scientists on 
the scenes13.
In fact, we are surprised to see “a nuclear blast.” Why was the Internet concerned with 
such stu? A little retrospect may help. 
Let us look into a history of the Internet. e following story is commonly known:
(4) In 1962, a nuclear confrontation seemed imminent. e United States (US) and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) were embroiled in the Cuban missile 
crisis. Both the US and the USSR were in the process of building hair-trigger nuclear 
ballistic missile systems. Each country pondered post-nuclear attack scenarios. US 
authorities considered ways to communicate in the aermath of a nuclear attack. 
How could any sort of “command and control network” survive? Paul Baran, a 
researcher at RAND, oered a solution: [D]esign a more robust communications 
network using “redundancy” and “digital” technology. At the time, naysayers dismissed 
Baran’s idea as unfeasible. But working with colleagues at RAND, Baran persisted. 
is eort would eventually become the foundation for the World Wide Web 
(RAND 2015).
On the extended line of this story, the preceding comments (2) and (3) appeared, although 
specialists have refused it14. 
is story dates back to the mid-20th. e main character is Paul Baran (1926-2011). 
He is considered the man who invented the Internet15. 
Baran worked for RAND, a think tank in the United States (the acronym of Research ANd 
Development)16. 
1962 was the time people could still imagine a WWII-like collision recurring. is 
drove the United States, where RAND is situated, to work out the measures against the 
worst-case scenarios. e war against the Soviet Union, the current Russia, was main 
concern.
Nuclear weapons, which appeared at the end of WWII, were still developed to extend 
their ranges (see “in the process of building hair-trigger nuclear ballistic missile systems” 
above). is was a real threat, culminating in the Cuban crisis. e Soviet Union deployed 
missiles in Cuba to defend its “comrade” communist government born through the Cuban 
revolution in 195917. 
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§5.  Baran’s solution
 e United States was exposed to the risks of the fatal destruction by the potential war 
against the USSR.
Meanwhile, o  cials were asking how they could keep their communication network 
in the case where the mainland was assaulted by the hair-trigger nuclear ballistic missiles.
 e solution Paul Baran gave to this problem was really ingenious:
(5) Distributed Network (Baran 1962, p.4)
§6.  Distributed Network
Facing Fig. (5), we can  nd Baran’s idea on the rightmost side, which is named a distrib-
uted network.
Listen to Baran’s explanation:
(6) [ e] communication network shall be composed of several hundred stations which 
must intercommunicate with one another. Survivability [of this network means] the 
percentage of stations surviving a physical attack […].  e centralized network 
[namely (A)] is basically vulnerable [because] destruction of the central node destroys 
intercommunication between [the] stations. [… at is why] we shall turn to consider 
[the] communication networks as “distributed” as possible. (Baran 1962, p.3)
In short, if we assemble the “stations,” which relay the information sent by each spot, into 
one point, as seen in (A) of Fig. (5), the attack destroying that very spot will spoil everything, 
or the whole network.
 e same is true of the decentralized network, namely (B) of Fig. (5).  us, to avoid 
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the worst-case scenario of the nuclear attack, which was called “a physical attack” in (6), 
the network named (C) of Fig. (5) became the best solution. It led to the birth of the Internet.
Chapter 2.  Dreyfus’s Criticism
is is a short history of the Internet, which tells us its strategic origin. e Internet was 
developed and designed to survive the worst-case scenario.
Soon aer its birth, however, the Internet dissolved into playrooms, which we call 
SNS’s today.  
In this chapter, we see the criticism by Dreyfus, who called the current situation of the 
Internet “the hi-tech synthesis of the worst features of the newspaper and the coeehouse.”18 
§7.  SNS
is is how the Internet came into existence. It was originally designed to send and receive 
information even in the worst-case scenario. 
Soon aer its birth, however, users went in another direction. Sterling, who wrote the 
previous comment of (2), described it as follows:
(7) By the second year of operation, however, an odd fact became clear. ARPANET’s 
users had warped the computer-sharing network into a dedicated, high-speed, 
federally subsidized electronic post- oce. e main trac on ARPANET was not 
long-distance computing. Instead, it was news and personal messages. Researchers 
were using ARPANET to collaborate on projects, to trade notes on work, and eventually, 
to downright gossip and schmooze. People had their own personal user accounts 
on the ARPANET computers, and their own personal addresses for electronic mail. 
Not only were they using ARPANET for person-to-person communication, but 
they were very enthusiastic about this particular service […] It wasn’t long before 
the invention of the mailing-list, [namely] an ARPANET broadcasting technique in 
which an identical message could be sent automatically to large numbers of network 
subscribers. Interestingly, one of the rst really big mailing-lists was “SF- LOVERS,” 
for science ction fans. Discussing science ction on the network was not work-related 
and was frowned upon by many ARPANET computer administrators, but this 
didn’t stop it from happening. (Sterling 1993)
ARPANET19 is the earliest form of the Internet that was born in 1969, constituted of only four 
computers at the beginning, later extending to een to thirty-seven nodes (Sterling 1993).
Soon aer its birth, according to Sterling, the users of the Net warped it into a “electronic 
post-oce” to “downright gossip and schmooze.” 
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Aer all, the Internet was destined to be the vehicle for SNS, such as a blog, BBS, 
Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, as we use it today.
§8.  High-Tech Synthesis of the Worst Features
In spite of the serious eorts of the inventors, the Net headed for entertaining purposes. 
Blogs, BBS’s, etc., where visitors chat freely, became main usage of the Net.
e philosopher who critically tackled this issue was Hurbert Dreyfus (1929-2011), 
who also had an experience to work for RAND20. 
A point for which Dreyfus blamed the Internet was its poor quality of discussion as 
we see it every time we visit a BBS, for example.
By reference to Søren Kierkegaard (1813-55), an existentialist in 19th century, Dreyfus 
criticized the current situation of the Net as follows:
(8) Kierkegaard would surely have seen in the Internet [－] with its Websites full of 
anonymous information from all over the world and [with] its interest groups that 
anyone in the world can join without qualications and where one can discuss any 
topic endlessly without consequences [－] the hi-tech synthesis of the worst features 
of the newspaper and the coeehouse. (Dreyfus 2001, p.77)
e newspaper and the coeehouse existed in Kierkegaard’s time as well. Kierkegaard blamed 
these places for their poor quality of discussion, which we may simply call “chat” today.
If Kierkegaard were still alive now, Dreyfus thought, he would nd on the Net “the 
high-tech synthesis of the worst features” of the newspaper and the coeehouse in his time.
§9.  Dreyfus’s criticism
Including other arguments with this view of Kierkegaard, Dreyfus’s criticism of the Internet 
can be summarized in the following way:
(9) Problems of the Net (Dreyfus 2001, p.75, p.78)
(i) People on the Net lack the rst-hand experience.
(ii) People on the Net fabricate everything only in the head abstractly.
(iii) People on the Net do not take any responsibility for the information they provide.
ese are realized on the extended line of ARPANET. e mailing-lists of SF-LOVERS set 
a good precedent of Dreyfus’s concern.
§10.  Merleau-Ponty
People can talk the story without its direct perception. is was the point Dreyfus blamed 
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the Internet for.
It is understandable more easily if we know the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
(1908-1961), who Dreyfus owed much argumentation to21.
Merleau-Ponty thought the body (le corps) plays an important role in understanding 
the world22. 
On the Internet, however, most of our transaction is done without any bodily, perceptual 
contact. As seen in e-mail, for example, we can make a deal without seeing even the face 
of the customer. 
Dreyfus thought it a serious problem23.
§11.  Purely Verbal Entities
Bodiless interchanges lacking perceptions appeared so weird to Dreyfus. at drove him 
to criticize the Net in itself.
Meanwhile, on the Net, we may have a positive picture, where we can y from one 
place to another quickly, as if we were free from bodily boundaries. e communication 
network allows us to indulge in such an ideal. 
Dreyfus admonished us on Net enthusiasm of this kind, the criticism of which the 
rst part of On the Internet was directed to (Dreyfus 2001, p.4).
Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty, a philosopher of the body, apparently endorsed a view 
similar to the Net enthusiasm. He said as follows:
(10) We nd a certain culture playing an essential role in perceiving others: language. 
Imagine a dialogue. In a dialogue, our verbal exchanges form a terrain shared 
among us. My thought and your thought are knitted into a fabric. My words and 
your words are called for naturally depending on progress of talk. We cooperate 
with each other; none of us takes the initiative. In a dialogue, you and I form one 
persona; you are no longer another person appearing outside my consciousness 
in a Sartrean manner24. Each of us is a collaborator for the other, and this reci-
procity is as perfect as if my perspective glided into yours so that we could coex-
ist in ubiquity. In a dialogue, I set myself free from my ego, while your thought 
remains yours. It is not me who created your thought, but I can seize it soon aer 
its birth as if I had had it. Your objection robs me of that thought which I should 
have known I could not have. It looks as if there were a mirror between us. When 
our dialogue ends, I return to myself, recalling something useful only for my life, 
while you return to yourself to be an alien unintelligible for me. is separation, 
however, may occurs to adolescents or grown-ups, not to small children who do 
not yet have their own egos. (Merleau-Ponty 1945, p.412)25
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Focusing on language, Merleau-Ponty ingeniously brought into relief a horizon of our 
dialogue and its connement to nothing like bodily boundaries or egos whatsoever.
Like this dialogue, we may emancipate ourselves from our daily thought and egos at 
least during conversation. And this should have been an original ideal of the Net.
Let us get as close to this ideal as possible. For this purpose, we must look into the 
function of language in more detail.
Chapter 3.  L’intermonde and Utilitarianism
Dreyfus blamed our interchange on the Net for lacking bodily perceptions, following 
Merleau-Ponty. But Merleau-Ponty himself had another ideal, where we set ourselves free 
from bodily boundaries to be purely verbal. With this horizon taken, we explore the realm 
of the Internet much deeper. 
§12.  L’intermonde
Although there was nothing like the Internet in Merleau-Ponty’s time, his life was much 
the same as ours. He knew newspapers, the telephone, TV, etc., which surely led him to 
the image like Fig. (1). 
Merleau-Ponty called it lʼintermonde, developing his thought:
(11) In any case, during dialogue, you and I need to agree to coexistence. While this is 
true, if none of us voluntarily engages in it, who on earth communicates, then? 
Who does the communication hold for? Suppose we communicate with each other, 
lacking the sense of coexistence. en, our communication will soon break down 
into pieces, where each of us manipulates the keyboard 100 kilometers apart. 
(Merleau-Ponty 1945, p.415)26
Merleau-Ponty knew we can be purely verbal. But at the same time, he cared about poten-
tial lack of coexistence. Ironically enough, Merleau-Ponty anticipated our problems on 
the Net so well in this respect as well.
§13.  Inquiry into Language
Merleau-Ponty knew what it is like to be on the Net. We can be purely verbal, while our 
interchenge is on the verge of breaking down. To overcome the dilemma, probably we 
need a detailed analysis of our speech-acts.
Unfortunately, Merleau-Ponty did not had no knowledge of that. In his time, like 
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), there were almost no philosophers in France who paid 
attention to the function of language. It is aer the discovery of Ferdinand de Saussure 
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(1857-1913) that they got interested in langue/langage27, though it led them to the notorious 
structuralism aer all.
We should take the other way around in order to see, as it were, dynamism on the Net. 
More concretely, we should appeal to another philosophy Dreyfus belonged to but broke 
with: analytic philosophy28. 
We take up, as its representative, the speech-act theory of John Langshaw Austin 
(1911-1960) below.
§14.  Example
e speech-act theory is a theory analyzing our verbal exchanges as action. 
is is not common in terms of tradition of analytic philosophy, as you see in static 
logical analysis like ∃x[Fx∧Gx∧∀y{Gy→(y=x)}]29. 
But the speech-act theory is the best to consider our interchange, because our verbal 
exchanges are not static computational arrangement of signs30. Typed words are action, 
and the only clue to know who s/he is. 
Let us take an example. 
Imagine you are on a BBS, reading comments by someone disgusting. He boasts, 
boasts, boasts …, even saying he will start a business. Fed up with it, then, you type the 
following words:
(12) I object that you can’t do that.
You picked a ght.
§15.  Sketch
On the Net, we have interchanges of this kind so frequently. Sometimes we get pleased, 
and at other times, words get on the nerves.
We do things with words. Insult, advice, objection, dismissal, encouragement, etc., how 
many acts humans do with words, in reality. e focus of the speech-act theory is on this 
very aspect. 
Let us see, on trial, how your speech-act aects another person in the preceding example:
(13) Utilitarian Sketch of Speech-act
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With the words of (12), you picked a ght. Your act is simply named Insult here31.
e focus is now on its consequence. You knew your act causes unpleasant feeling in 
another mind; that is, the man of annoyance is shocked by your words. 
e arrow → shows this causality. With the act, you fullled your malicious wish, 
namely pleasure of malevolence, as the right side of Fig. (13) shows.
§16.  Comparison with Ordinary Act32
Pleasure of malevolence is a term of utilitarianism33. We use this tenet tentatively for a 
simple comparison between speech-acts and ordinary acts. 
Let us take another example of an ordinary act. 
Imagine you see an elderly woman in trouble carrying her heavy bag. en, probably 
some benevolent feeling comes into your mind, while you are sure that she will be pleased 
if you help her. at is why you decided to take the action of helping her:
(14) Utilitarian Sketch of Ordinary Act
is gure is much the same as the preceding one, (13), which makes parallel between 
speech-acts and ordinary acts. 
§17.  Aim of the Last Chapter
e pursuit of utilitarian ethics is not our aim at present. Our focus is on the parallelism 
between speech-acts and ordinary acts. 
As seen above, speech-acts have much the same eect as ordinary acts, while ordinary 
acts have factors enough to constitute themselves, namely hands, legs, faces, bags, and so 
on, which we may call physical stu.
Speech-acts lack such physical stu. ey express themselves only with words.
What dierence does it make? is is our concern below. In the end, we will see the 
intricacy of speech-acts especially on the Net.
Chapter 4.  Speech-act Theory
We made parallel between ordinary acts and speech-acts. But speech-acts lack physical 
stu, which makes them dicult to understand. 
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We very likely misunderstand the intention of the speech-act. Or more precisely, we 
very likely misunderstand what type of speech-act we read or listen to.
In this last chapter, we bring into relief this aspect of speech-acts with the help of another 
theory developed by Grice. 
§18.  Perlocution
We saw a utilitarian eect of speech-acts in the previous chapter. Austin, a pioneer of the 
speech-act theory, actually noticed it. 
He said as follows:
(15) Saying something will oen, or even normally, produce certain consequential 
eects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, 
or of other persons: and it may be done with the design, intention, or purpose of 
producing them […]. (Austin 1962, p.101)
Surprisingly enough, here Austin completely grasps the kernel of our preceding discussion. 
He named it perlocution (ibid.).
§19.  Illocution
Austin knew a utilitarian eect of a speech-act. But his discussion is, looked into, unacceptable.
First of all, perlocution is not a speech-act in the strict sense. Illocution is “In saying some-
thing, we do something.” By contrast, perlocution is “By saying something, we do something.”34 
e dierence between illocution and perlocution is “In” and “By,” which implies the 
speech-act, or illocution, is based on conventionality, while perlocution is based on causality.35 
We have already seen causality. e arrow → in Fig. (13) shows it. Meanwhile, conven-
tionality is a kind of social fact that utterance (12), for example, turns into the act of insult. 
§20.  Revised Figure
Conventionality, which is required for illocution, is not so easy to describe. On trial, let us 
put it in the preceding gure:
(16) Revised gure of (13)
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e sign of equality = of ① shows conventionality, a social fact that utterance (12) turns 
into insult. Only aer we take (12) as such, namely as the act of insult, it brings about the 
consequence (his being shocked), as the arrow → of ② indicates.
§21.  Austin’s Mistake
Viewed from the revised gure, we justly conclude that Austin apparently made a mistake 
in his discussion of speech-acts. 
Take another look at (15). erein, Austin took the course of ③ of Fig. (16) probably 
wrongly. He thought “saying something,” namely utterance (12), directly causes the unpleasant 
feeling “of the audience.”
But this is not the case. Typing the words in itself does not cause the unpleasant feeling 
of another person. e course ③ holds only when we surprise another person by saying 
“Boo,” for example36.
We must take the route from ① to ②, instead; that is, rst, the utterance is taken as 
insult (①), and then, the speech-act makes another person shocked (②).
On this route from ① to ②, the main act is insult as illocution, not making sounds or 
typing symbols in itself. us, to know verbal exchange, only illocution should be dealt 
with. e route ③ of perlocution is illusion, so to speak.
§22.  Enigma: Arrow ②
e causality of perlocution is dierent from the conventionality of illocution. is dierence 
is the one between ③ and ② in Fig. (16). Another person is shocked by being insulted, not by 
hearing sounds by seeing letters. 
Let us reect on how the route from ① to ② holds. 
It is not because the meaning of insult includes the feeling of unpleasantness. If a small 
child makes fun of you, that is, insults you, probably you never mind it. Or even in the case 
of (12), the man of annoyance might be so arrogant as to ignore your comment of insult. 
at is, your insult never necessarily results in the unpleasant feeling of another person; it 
always has exceptions. So a speech-act never includes its consequence as its meaning. 
e reason why the route from ① to ② holds is not because we, as listeners/readers, 
scrutinize the intention of the speaker/writer’s behind his/her words, either. Regardless of 
his/her intention, the speech-act could bring about a certain feeling in the listener/reader’s 
mind, so the speaker/writer naturally say, “I did not mean that…” 
ere are two questions to take up.
First, how does such and such an utterance turn into the speech-act like insult? is 
is a question concerning ① of Fig. (16).
Second, how does such and such a speech-act cause such and such a feeling in our 
mind? is is a question concerning ② of Fig. (16).
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Regarding the latter, namely the second question, it is too much to answer within this 
paper. It belongs to philosophy of causation, which has plural branches, such as historical 
causation37, legal causation38, and so on, while they all fall under singular causation39. 
Some justication by generality40 may work, but basically we do not know why such 
and such singular causation holds.
e most familiar instance is certain words mentally hurting us, or more precisely, 
strongly irritating us in succession. 
We cannot recognize the true reason for that. 
Apparently, it does not belong to psychology, a brand of objective sciences. Rather, it 
stays an enigma in our social lives.
§23.  Question: Arrow ①
We cannot know the reason why such and such a speech-act causes such and such a feeling. 
It stays an enigma.
is makes us turn the other way around. How does such and such an utterance turn 
into a specic speech-act? For example, you said (12). It turned into insult. Why?
is is the rst question taken up in §22 and appropriate to the speech-act theory.
 We should notice that it is not a question from a viewpoint of the speaker/writer. 
Reect on how you make a specic utterance. When you have an intention to insult a 
man of annoyance, are you concerned about the word order? 
Your aim is to insult him, not an arrangement of signs41. e connection between the 
actual utterance like (12) and the intended speech-act like insult does not become a problem, 
seen from a standpoint of the speaker/writer. We throw words as a whole at the listener/
reader, not caring about its precise word order. 
e problem looms up, rather, when we take a viewpoint of the listener/reader. How 
does s/he take the utterance like (12) as the act of insult?
Note that this is the question concerning ① of Fig. (16), not ②.
Whether or not the act of insult causes unpleasant feeling in another mind depends 
on the, as it were, toughness of the listener/reader. It should be distinguished strictly from 
whether or not the utterance in itself is taken as insult. 
e former, that is, whether or not the act of insult causes unpleasant feeling in another 
mind, was le aside as an enigmatic problem of causality as stated in the previous section (§22).
en, why were the words (12) taken to be the act of insult by the listener/reader? 
is is the last question open to us.
§24.  Misunderstanding or Implicature
Question ① of Fig. (16) is a problem of the listener/reader, not of the speaker/writer. It 
essentially includes the problem of misunderstanding.
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In the preceding example, you said (12) with the intention to insult the man of annoyance 
on a BBS. But he might be so arrogant as to take your comment merely as  an advice. 
Let me illustrate it:
(17) Utterance (12)  Advice (objection)42
 Insult (ghting words)43 
e advice in this context is taken a kind of objection. at is, your words could be taken 
as strategic advice objecting to too hasty a business plan. e man of annoyance might take 
your comment simply as such, positively.
But your intention was to insult him, negatively. 
Phenomena of this kind oen occur in verbal exchanges, especially on the Net. One 
utterance turns into dierent speech-acts. is is a pitfall we most likely fall into during 
conversation. We name it implicature. 
§25.  Grice’s Theory
Implicature is originally devised by Paul Grice (1913-1985), another key person of the 
speech-act theory. 
e problematic is, however, that Grice thought implicature in the context of utterances. 
To take an example:44
(18) He hasn’t been to prison yet.
(19) Utterance (18) “C is the sort of person likely to yield to the temptation.”
 “C’s colleagues are really very unpleasant and treacherous.”
Imagine A and B are talking about a mutual friend, C, who is now working in a bank, A 
asks B how C is getting on in his job, and B replies (18), aer he says “Oh quite well, I 
think, he likes his colleagues, and….”
e additional utterances, which B did not say in reality, are what Grice thought 
implicature. ey are shown at the end of each arrow depicted in Fig. (19): “C is the sort 
of…” and “C’s colleagues…”
§26.  Risk on the Net
According to Grice, the problem the utterance like (12) potentially has is to turn into another 
utterance. No way can it be true, because the utterance is made only once. 
See the previous gure of (16) again. e utterance is made only once. e problem is 
therefore: one utterance can have plural meanings as speech-acts.
You said (12) on a BBS, for example. It could have as plural meanings as those in Fig. 
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(17). Some viewers take it ghting words, and others take it a simple advice.
On the Net especially, misunderstanding and not misunderstanding come across 
each other to make the interchange more and more complex. We have seen exactly this 
risky situation with the help of the speech-act theory.
§27.  Concluding Remark
On the Net, we are ubiquitous. Each of us can instantly appear on one place, rushing to another. 
is makes our interchanges too easy, too frequent, too intense and too irresponsible.
Dreyfus’s concern was exactly about this, so that he warned us not to be involved in 
the interchange on the Net too much. 
Nevertheless, the Net reects our essence in some undeniable way. We are purely 
verbal on the Net, while our interchanges in actual societies are mostly verbal, not physical 
like helping an elderly woman bring a heavy bag. 
We do many things with words. Exchanges on the Net light up this side more brightly 
than we expect. 
Words are, however, destined to be misunderstood. 
To make matters worse, we do not know why such and such a speech-act, which 
might be a result of misunderstanding, gets on the nerves45. 
All these make our verbal interchange more and more complex. And it is lit up most 
brightly on the Net. 
True, SNS’s, such as blogs, BBS’s, Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, are no more than 
tries at the beginning. But as we commit ourselves in these tries deeper and deeper, we 
cannot help reaching some point not to be overlooked. 
We have tried to bring into relief a sidelight of this deep, serious, even criminatory 
aspect of our verbal exchange, which most likely occurs on the Net46.
＿
1 is article is partially based on my lecture at Musashino University in 2016, and partially on 
my preceding study of Austin (Kaneko 2017, ch.2 of par.II, ch.1 of par.III).
2 Applied ethics is a generic term for biomedical ethics (Beauchamp & Childress 2009), 
engineering ethics (Haris et al. 2004), business ethics (Beauchamp & Bowie 2003), and so on. 
is origin of Internet ethics justies our later reference to utilitarianism (§§15-16), because 
utilitarianism is one of the bases for applied ethics (Kaneko 2017, sec. 65).
3 Read the description by Bynum (2008, intro).
4 We use the term “the Net” instead of “the Internet” frequently, following Dreyfus (2001, p.6 
etc.).
5 See the description by Bynum (2008, 1.1). 
6 Or information is no more than news. Mathematically dened, it is log2 P
1
(E) (Inoue 2007). is 
formula means information is merely a result of the event, E, probabilistically predicted.
198
7 Winer thought of thinking as information processing (Bynum 2008, 1.1). is is unacceptable 
(Kaneko 2017, sec.29-sec.32).
8 e acronym of Social Network Service.
9 e acronym of Bulletin Board System.
10 Section numbers are counted consecutively regardless of the changes of chapters.
11 http://www.ryuumu.co.jp/ryuumu/ain/vistacd02/e8.html
12 “e World Wide Web” is also used instead of “the Internet,” following Dreyfus (2001, p.79 
etc.).
13 See note 14 below. As for this, Tommi Karttaavi of Internet Society
(https://www.internetsociety.org/) sent me an interesting mail. 
Bruce Sterling is a famous science ction writer and keeping his article from the early days 
of the Internet Society on our website is probably more for historical reasons than historical 
accuracy in the scientic meaning. (received on March 7, 2016)
14 Instead of (4), most scientists refer to the memorandums of Joseph Carl Robnett Licklider 
(1915-1990) at MIT, whose idea of Galactic Network was precedent to the Internet.
Licklider apparently did not think about a nuclear war, tackling more technological issues 
(Licklider 1963). In addition to Lickliderʼs work, the theory of communication through packet 
switching of Leonard Kleinrock (1934- ) at MIT, and the computer network proposed by 
Lawrence Gilman Roberts (1937-2018) should be taken into account. Also, Donald Davis 
(1924-2000) at NPL and researchers at UCLA also played an important role (Bary et al. 2015).
In spite of these specialistsʼ opinions, recently BBC doubly presented the same view as 
ours in the text, namely (4), when it reported the decease of Paul Baran (BBC 2015, see also 
Elmer-Dewitt 2001; Sterling 1993).
15 In reality, as of 2011, BBC reported the death of Paul Baran as such.
16 See their website (https://www.rand.org/about.html). RAND is a think tank in the United 
States, Interestingly enough, Dreyfus worked for RAND (Dreyfus 1965).
17  See the explication of Sato et al. (2007, pp.347-348, p.352).
18  See (8) in the text.
19 ARPA is the acronym of Advanced Research Projects Agency of Pentagon in the United 
States, to which Licklider also belonged (Licklider 1963). Reading this part of (7), we see the 
story of Baran in (3) and that of Licklider in note 14 intricately cut across each other in reality.
20 See Dreyfus (1965).
21 See Dreyfus (1962), Dreyfus (1996), Dreyfus (2002).
22 Instead of “understanding the world,” Merleau-Ponty uses the French word “la perception,” 
naturally (Merleau-Ponty 1945, p.11, p.100, p.170; Kaneko 2017, p.151 note12). According to 
Dreyfus, the essence of Merleau-Pontyʼs perception is the intentional arc and the maximal grip 
(Dreyfus 2002, p.367).
e intentional arc, which Merleau-Ponty also used in the name of “un arc intentionnel” (1945, 
p.170), means the tight connection between the agent and the world (Dreyfus 2002, p.367).
The maximal grip means the bodyʼs tendency to refine its response so as to bring the 
current situation closer to an optimal gestalt (Dreyfus 2002, p.367).
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Dreyfus reached these points through his discussion on skill acquisition (Dreyfus 1996; 
Dreyfus 2002, pp.368f.), while his study on Heidegger, especially the concept of attuning 
(Stimmung), aected him, seemingly (Dreyfus 1991, p.169; Dreyfus 2001, p.59).
23 Dreyfusʼs criticism of this kind is typically found in his criticism of distance learning (Dreyfus 
2001, pp.25f.). 
24 Here, Merleau-Ponty criticizes Sartreʼs philosophy of transcendence of objects and others 
(Sartre 1943, pp.27f., pp.265f.; Sartre 1938, pp.180f.).
25 e translation is intentionally adjusted to our argument. e original is as follows:
Il y a, en particulier, un objet culturel qui va jouer un rôle essentiel dans la perception dʼautrui: 
cʼest le langage. Dans lʼexpérience du dialogue, il se constitue entre autrui et moi un terrain 
commun, ma pensée et la sienne ne font quʼun seul tissu, mes propos et ceux de lʼinterlocuteur 
sont appelés par lʼétat de la discussion, ils sʼinsèrent dans une opération commune dont aucun 
de nous nʼest le créateur. Il y a là un être à deux, et autrui nʼest plus ici pour moi un simple 
comportement dans mon champ transcendantal, ni dʼailleurs moi dans le sien, nous 
sommes lʼun pour lʼautre collaborateurs dans une réciprocité parfaite, nos perspectives 
glissent lʼune dans lʼautre, nous coexistons à travers un même monde. Dans le dialogue présent, 
je suis libéré de moi-même, les pensées dʼautrui sont bien des pensées siennes, ce nʼest pas 
moi qui les forme, bien que je les saisisse aussitôt nées ou que je les devance, et même, 
lʼobjection que me fait lʼinterlocuteur mʼarrache des pensées que je ne savais pas posséder, 
de sorte que si je lui prête des pensées, il me fait penser en retour. Cʼest seulement après 
coup, quand je me suis retiré du dialogue et mʼen ressouviens, que je puis le réintégrer à ma 
vie, en faire un épisode de mon histoire privée, et quʼautrui rentre dans son absence, ou, 
dans la mesure où il me reste présent, est senti comme une menace pour moi. La perception 
dʼautrui et le monde intersubjectif ne font problème que pour des adultes. (Merleau-Ponty 
1945, p.412)
26 e translation is intentionally adjusted to our argument. e original is as follows:
La coexistence, doit être en tout cas vécue par chacun. Si nous ne sommes ni lʼun ni lʼautre 
des consciences constituantes, au moment où nous allons communiquer et trouver un 
monde commun, on se demande qui communique et pour qui existe ce monde. Et si 
quelquʼun communique avec quelquʼun, si lʼintermonde nʼest pas un en soi inconcevable, sʼil 
doit exister pour nous deux, alors la communication se brise de nouveau et chacun de nous 
opère dans son monde privé comme deux joueurs opèrent sur deux échiquiers [distants] à 
100 kilomètres lʼun de lʼautre. Encore les joueurs peuvent-ils, par téléphone ou par corres-
pondance, se communiquer leurs décisions, ce qui revient à dire quʼils font partie du même 
monde (Merleau-Ponty 1945 : 415).
27 See the description by Raynolds (2016, sec. 3-a).
28 See Dreyfusʼs criticism of Searle (Dreyfus 1999) and support of Heidegger (Dreyfus 1991, 
intro). In these works, Dreyfus clearly showed deance to analytic philosophy.
29 Representing Russelʼs theory of description. 
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30 See the description in §23 as well.
31 As for its categorization in the speech-act theory, see §24.
32 As for utilitarianism, see note 2 again.
33 See the argument of Bentham (1789, ch. v) and that of Kaneko (2017, p.87).
34 See the explanation of Austin (1962, p.91, pp.101-102) and that of Kaneko (2017, p.52).
35 See the explanation of Austin (1962, p.116) and that of Kaneko (2017, p.52).
36 is discussion relates to my previous argument (Kaneko 2017, sec.36).
37 See the book of Danto (1965).
38 See the book of Hart & Honoré (1985).
39 See the explanation of Kaneko (2012).
40 See the discussion of Danto (1965, pp.212-213).
41 is leads us to the speech-act theory, not the static logical analysis abandoned in §14.
42 Advice as objection can be classied into expositives in accordance with the speech-act theory 
(Austin 1962, p.162). Expositives are a type of speech-act literally exposing oneʼs idea or view 
to the hearer to build or fit it into the frame of conversation, interlocution, dialogue, etc 
(Austin 1962, p.85, p.152, p.161; Kaneko 2017, sec.45). So there is no intention to oend the 
listener/reader as long as the utterance belongs to expositives. 
43 Insult is classied into behavitives in accordance with the speech-act theory (Austin 1962, p.161 
see “For challenges…”). Behavitives show the reaction to what another person made for/
against me  (Austin 1962, p.83, p.152, p.160; Kaneko 2017, sec.39). For example, in the case of 
(12), you show in public your annoyance against the manʼs behavior on the BBS. Note that 
this does not include any successive behavior, and in this respect, behavitives differ from 
commisives, for example (Austin 1962, pp.151-152, p.157, p.163; Kaneko 2017, sec.42).
44 See the argument by Grice (1967, p.24).
45 See §22 again.
46 Both psychopaths and harassers of morals are observed to be ingenious manipulators of words 
(Hirigoyen 1998, pp.93f.; Stout 2005, p.7). In other words, they are criminals of speech-acts.
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